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Abstract
The number of social relationships that a single human be-
ing can possibly be involved in is limited because individuals
face time constraints (that is, time costs) in constructing and
maintaining social relationships; further, the distribution of the
strength of such relationships (as measured by frequency of so-
cial interaction) looks significantly skewed (a power law distri-
bution), that is, a few strong relationships and many weak rela-
tionships. This skewedness suggests that the costs and benefits
of bonding with others depend on the strength of the social
relationships: if it involves uniform costs and benefits, the dis-
tribution would not be skewed. The bonding is known as social
grooming. That is, humans strategically construct their social
relationships, and thus, complex human societies should also be
strategically constructed. Therefore, it is important to know
their strategies for understanding human societies. Previous
studies provide evidence of social grooming strategies by exam-
ining the evolution of social grooming methods and the differ-
ence between the various social grooming methods. However,
quantitative laws that are important for theoretically under-
standing human societies are still open to investigation. Social
big data is a particularly powerful tool for finding such laws.
Therefore, we analyse data from six communication systems
(Twitter, a social networking site providing two types of in-
teractions, an avatar chat, a mobile phone and a short message
service). We find a simple quantitative law by which social rela-
tionships are constrained Nma (a > 1); here, N is the number of
social relationships and m is a mean of the strength of those rela-
tionships. The fact that deep social relationships require higher
costs per relationship than shallow relationships is suggested by
a > 1 (if the both is equal then a will be 1), because the ef-
fect of m on the constraint increases with m. For exploring why
a is greater than 1, we conduct an individual-based simulation
where social grooming costs are assumed to increase linearly
with the strength of social relationships. Our results indicate
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that this model fits all data sets, that is, it displays an expla-
nation capacity for the phenomenon. In addition, an analysis of
this simulation proves our assumption about the social grooming
cost increasing with the strength of social relationships as being
true. Moreover, it suggests that its gradient increases the width
and shallowness of these relationships. The law and its causes
suggest that mankind’s evolution of social grooming has enabled
changing social structures, and the phenomenon is due to the
constraints of the social network generation. These findings will
contribute towards an explanation of the evolution of the vari-
ous social grooming methods of humans and their significantly
large social group.
Based on the social brain hypothesis (Byrne R and Whiten A, 1989;
Whiten A and Byrne R, 1997; Dunber RIM, 2000; Dunbar RIM,
2003), an explanation of social structures, which are typical for humankind, is
expected to offer knowledge about human origins, such as the limitation on the
number of social relationships (Dunber RIM, 2000; Dunbar RIM, 2003;
Hill RA and Dunbar RIM, 2003; Gonc¸alves B et al., 2011; Arnaboldi
V et al., 2013a) and the skewness of social relationships (Zhou WX et al.,
2005; Hossmann T et al., 2011; Song C et al., 2012; Arnaboldi V et
al., 2012; Hu T et al., 2013; Arnaboldi V et al., 2013b; Fujihara A
et al, 2014), that is, its distributions following a power law (Song C et al.,
2012; Pachur T et al., 2012; Arnaboldi V et al., 2012; Fujihara A
et al, 2014; Hossmann T et al., 2011; Hu T et al., 2013). These social
structures may be caused by human beings’ social grooming strategies (Dunbar
RIM, 2004).
Social grooming is used to construct and maintain social relationships. This
behaviour is important in complex human societies (Dunber RIM, 2000).
Close social relationships lead to mutual cooperation (Uchino BN et al.,
1996; Silk JB et al., 2003; Hill RA et al., 2008; Russell YI and Phelps
S, 2013; Takano M et al., 2016a; Takano M et al., 2016b; Dunbar RIM,
2016). A high sociability among baboon mothers, for example, increases the
probability of their children’s survival, thanks to increased cooperation from
others (Silk JB et al., 2003); similarly, humans tend to co-operate more with
close friends than with others (Takano M et al., 2016a; Dunbar RIM,
2016). On the other hand, having many weak social relationships helps in
obtaining a variety of information which is advantageous in a complex soci-
ety (Granovetter M, 1973; Dunbar RIM, 2004; Eagle N et al., 2010;
Arnaboldi V et al., 2013c).
Social relationships provide humans with various advantages. However, they
face cognitive constraints (Dunbar RIM, 2012) (for example, memory and
processing capacity) and time constraints (that is, time costs) in constructing
and maintaining social relationships. These time costs are not negligible, as
humans spend a fifth of their day in social grooming (Dunbar RIM, 1998)
and maintaining social relationships (Hill RA and Dunbar RIM, 2003;
Roberts SGB and Dunbar RIM, 2011). Therefore, the mean strength of
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existing social relationships has a negative correlation with the number of social
relationships (Roberts SGB et al., 2009; Miritello G et al., 2013a).
Humans must construct and maintain social relationships within the con-
straints of this trade-off. Thus, we expect that they employ strategies to dis-
tribute the limited time resources to maximize benefits from their social rela-
tionships (Brown SL and Brown RM, 2006; Miritello G et al., 2013b;
Saramaki J et al., 2014). As a result of such strategies, social relationship
strengths (as measured by frequency of social grooming (Roberts SGB and
Dunbar RIM, 2011; Arnaboldi V et al., 2012; Song C et al., 2012;
Arnaboldi V et al., 2013b; Fujihara A et al, 2014; Saramaki J et al.,
2014) may often show a much skewed distribution (Zhou WX et al., 2005;
Arnaboldi V et al., 2013b) (distributions following a power law (Song C et
al., 2012; Arnaboldi V et al., 2012; Fujihara A et al, 2014; Hossmann
T et al., 2011; Hu T et al., 2013)).
In other words, human beings’ time cost distribution strategies should affect
their structures of social relationships. Similarly, the advantage of strategies
may depend on social grooming methods because recipients’ satisfaction lev-
els depend on social grooming methods, that is, face to face and video call
communications show higher satisfaction levels than phone and text communi-
cations (Vlahovic T et al., 2013), and their time and efforts involved are
also different. Humans have various social grooming methods, such as physical
contacts (Nelson H, 2007), gaze grooming (Kobayashi H and Kohshima
S, 1997; Kobayashi H and Hashiya K, 2011), gossip (Dunbar RIM,
2004), greetings, phone calls (Vlahovic T et al., 2013), e-mails (Vlahovic
T et al., 2013) and social networking sites (SNS) (Burke M and Kraut
RE, 2014; Scissors L et al, 2016). These methods will have differing effects
in the formation of social relationships and on the time costs.
Human beings maintain large complex social groups by using various and
effective social grooming methods efficiently (Dunbar RIM, 2004). Humans
have acquired these methods during the evolutionary process. Apes, which are
closely related to humans, clean each other’s fur as social grooming (Naka-
mura M, 2003). In contrast, humans almost do not do grooming (Nelson
H, 2007). Alternatively, human beings do lightweight social grooming which
has evolved to adapt large groups, for example, gaze grooming (Kobayashi
H and Kohshima S, 1997; Kobayashi H and Hashiya K, 2011) and
gossip (Dunbar RIM, 2004) that enable humans to have several social re-
lationships and less time and efforts are required for these methods. These
previous studies provide evidence of social grooming strategies by examining
the evolution of social grooming methods. However, quantitative laws that are
important for theoretically understanding human societies are still open to in-
vestigation. Additionally, humans often invest in novel social grooming methods
on the Internet, such as social networking sites, online chats and video calls. We
will need to know the effects of social grooming methods on social relationships
for a safe and comfortable relationship. However, little is known about its effects
and mechanisms (Arnaboldi V et al., 2013c).
This study aims to discover how social grooming methods influence time cost
3
distribution strategies of the methods and social structures depending on those
strategies. We analyse the following six data sets of communication systems:
Twitter data (used as a test set in (Cheng Z et al., 2010), 755 group chats
(see the supplementary information (SI) Fig. 1 for specifications), 755 wall
communications (see S1 Fig. for specifications), Japanese avatar chat Ameba
Pigg (see SI Fig. 2 for specifications), mobile phone calls (Madan A et al,
2012), and short message service (SMS) (Madan A et al, 2012). These
human behaviour data sets enable us to analyse social interactions among several
users quantitatively. They are useful for constructing theoretical models of social
phenomena. Studies (Arnaboldi V et al., 2012; Song C et al., 2012;
Fujihara A et al, 2014; Hossmann T et al., 2011; Arnaboldi V et al.,
2013b; Hu T et al., 2013; Takano M et al., 2016a; Saramaki J et al.,
2014; Dunbar RIM, 2016; Takano M et al., 2016b) previously cited in
this paper have also analysed data from SNSs, mobile phones, social network
games, and SMSs.
Data Analysis
Data Sets
We used six data sets (see table 1 for details): 1) Twitter data (used as test set
in (Cheng Z et al., 2010) recording interactions among 2, 585 people with
278, 475 relationships, from 23/6/2007 to 17/3/2010, where an act of social
grooming was defined as using the “mention” or “reply” functions to commu-
nicate with others; 2) and 3) Data from the Japanese SNS 755, published by
7gogo, Inc. (http://7gogo.jp/), which provides two types of communication sys-
tems data, dating from 1/1/2015 to 31/3/2015, which we treated as two different
sets (see SI Fig. 1 for specifications), namely data from group chats and that
from wall communications. The former data records interactions among 17, 796
users with 238, 611 relationships, where we defined an act of social grooming as
communicating in a chat limited to two members. The latter data records inter-
actions among 20, 000 users with 534, 475 relationships, where we defined an act
of social grooming as posting a comment on another’s wall. We removed data
relevant to official users from both data sets; 4) Data from Japanese avatar
chat Ameba Pigg, published by CyberAgent, Inc. (https://pigg.ameba.jp/),
which records interactions among 76, 379 users with 1, 610, 710 relationships,
from 1/10/2014 to 31/12/2015 (see SI Fig. 2 for specifications), where we
defined an act of social grooming as communicating in a chat limited to two
members; 5) Data from mobile phone calls (Madan A et al, 2012), recording
mobile phone calls among 73 people with 7, 805 relationships from 5/9/2008 to
29/6/2009, where we defined an act of social grooming as a call to another;
6) Data from SMS (Madan A et al, 2012), which records SMSs among 61
people with 2, 266 relationships from 1/1/2008 to 27/6/2009, where we defined
an act of social grooming as sending a message to another.
In the data sets from Twitter, 755 (group chat and wall communication) and
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Ameba Pigg, we limited the targets of analysis to active users who had more
number of social grooming days than the 50th percentile among Twitter users
and the 75th percentile among 755 and Ameba Pigg users because these internet
service data sets included many inactive users. In this paper, we defined the
strength of social relationships dij as the days on which individual i does social
grooming to individual j.
Analysis
In the six communication systems examined in this study, the distributions of
the strengths of social relationships d showed power law distributions (Fig. 1),
similar to those observed in previous studies (Arnaboldi V et al., 2012; Song
C et al., 2012; Fujihara A et al, 2014; Hossmann T et al., 2011; Hu
T et al., 2013). Individuals selected social grooming partners in proportion
to the strength of their social relationships, that is, the individuals tended to
reinforce their strong social relationships; these power law distributions were
generated by the Yule-Simon process (Yule GU, 1925; Simon HA, 1955;
Newman MEJ, 2005) (Fig. 2), similar to a previous study (Pachur T et al.,
2012). Thus, individuals distributed limited time resources in proportion to the
strength of their social relationships and this led to the further strengthening of
these relationships. It shows that individuals selected social grooming partners
depending on the strength of their social relationships.
As above, these skew distributions seem to be caused by individuals’ time
cost distribution strategies. Here, we considered a simple model as a null model
to analysed how individuals construct social relationships depending on their
strength under time cost constraints. If the daily social grooming cost is in-
dependent of the strength of the relationship then an individual’s total social
grooming cost C is
∑N
i=1 di, where di is the strength of social relationships from
the individual to individual i, and N is the total number of social grooming part-
ners. If m is the mean of strengths of social relationships (that is,
∑N
i=1 di/N),
then C =
∑N
i=1 di = Nm. Therefore, under this assumption, N should be in-
versely proportional to m. We conducted the following regression analysis to
confirm this hypothesis in the data sets:
logN ∼ Normal(µ, σ), (1)
µ = −a logm+ b log u,
where u is the number of days of participation for each user, that is, we assumed
that a user’s total social grooming costs were equal to the number of days for
which he/she had participated in the activity (C = ub). If this hypothesis is
correct, then a (the coefficient of logm) should be 1.
Figure 3 shows that all data sets obey C = Nma (a > 1) (see table 2 for the
regression results). That is, the null model did not fit the data sets, that is, social
grooming cost is not independent of the strength of the relationship. In other
words, individuals who had a few strong relationships (that is, large m) invested
more in relationships than individuals who had many weak relationships (that
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is, small m). a > 1 shows that for C = Nma, the stronger the social relationship
d, the more social grooming costs increased per day because the effect of m on
C increases with m.
To determine how the strength of relationship d affects social grooming costs,
we analysed the relation between communication volumes v and the strength of
social relationships d. Figure 4 shows that the strengths increased the volumes
of communication per day, that is, social grooming costs also probably increased
with increase in strengths. Figure 5 shows that the increase in gradients was
analogized in each data set, that is, this shows gradients depending on social
grooming density as distinct from those depending on social grooming frequency.
That is, the results of the analysis show that communication volumes v increased
along with the relationship strength d and the gradients were independent of the
number of days of the data periods t. Consequently, social grooming cost should
increase with an increase in social grooming density (d/t), under the assumption
that social grooming costs are proportional to communication volume v.
Individual-based Simulation
Model
To explain a > 1 for C = Nma, we constructed a simulation model of so-
cial grooming cost distribution strategies based on the assumption that social
grooming costs increase with an increase in social grooming density d/t. We
used a linear social grooming cost function c(d) = αd/t+ β as the simplest as-
sumption (if α = 0 then it is the null model). In the model, we considered two
type individuals which were groomers and groomees, and groomers construct
social relationships using their limited resources (that is, time), based on this
assumption and the Yule–Simon process.
We conducted the following simulation for T step to construct social rela-
tionships dij . At each step t, groomer i repeats the following for R > 0. R is
reset to an initial value R0 before each step t. Each i has a resource R that
is spent when i performs social grooming with others. Each i creates a social
relationship with a stranger, groomee j, depending on probability qi, where the
strength of social relationship dij is 1 and i pays the cost β from its resource R
(if R < β, then dij is R/β and R becomes 0). In contrast, i reinforces its social
relationships depending on probability 1− qi. Each i selects a social grooming
partner j depending on a probability proportional to the strength of the social
relationships between i and j (dij), then i adds 1 to the strength of its social re-
lationship (that is, the Yule-Simon process) and pays the cost c(dij) = αdij/t+β
from R (if R < c(d), then i adds R/c(d) to its strength of social relationship
dij and R becomes 0). Each i does not perform the act of social grooming
twice with the same groomees in each step t. Therefore, selected groomees are
excluded from the selection process of a social grooming partner j in each step
t.
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Experiments
First, we tested the fit of this model. That is, we optimized parameters α and
β to fit the regression lines of Figure 3, where the evaluation function was the
mean square error between simulation results and regression lines, T was the
period for each data set, R0 was the 75th percentile of each user’s use-days u
divided by T (R0 = 0.126 and T = 998 (Twitter), R0 = 0.258 and T = 120 (755
group chats), R0 = 0.225 and T = 120 (755 wall communications), R0 = 0.164
and T = 456 (Ameba Pigg), R0 = 0.589 and T = 297 (mobile phone) and
R0 = 0.107 and T = 543 (SMS)). The number of groomees was set large enough.
If our hypothesis is correct then α > 0. We found that this model fitted all
data sets (Fig. 6), that is, it had an explanation capacity for the phenomenon
a > 1 for C = Nma, with a monotonically increasing cost function (α > 0).
It demonstrates that the phenomenon a > 1 can be attributed to a groomers’
tendency to invest higher costs in strong rather than weak social relationships.
Next, we analysed the effect of parameter α on the structure of social rela-
tionships by using the model; we used T , R and β of the Twitter data set, as
in the former experiment. As the result demonstrates, a was determined by the
cost function gradient α (Fig. 7A), and the power law coefficients of the strength
of social relationships increased with the gradient α (Fig. 7B and 7C), that is,
the gradient increased the width and shallowness of social relationships. Because
the increase of the gradient α decreased the number of social relationships of
groomers with strong social relationships, they have to invest time in strong
social relationships to maintain these relationships. Consequently, increase in
α decreased strong social relationships, and structures of social relationships
became relatively wide and shallow.
Discussion
There is a trade-off between the number of social relationships (that is, N) and
the mean strength of social relationships (that is, m) (Roberts SGB et al.,
2009; Miritello G et al., 2013a) as humans must perform frequent social
grooming to maintain close relationships (Hill RA and Dunbar RIM, 2003;
Roberts SGB and Dunbar RIM, 2011; Saramaki J et al., 2014). Here,
we found a simple law where N was inversely proportional to ma (a > 1). The
a is due to the increase in social grooming costs; the costs increase with the
strengths of social relationships. This cost increase may be due to the fact
that strong social relationships tend to be the site of complex and frequent
communications.
We also found that the gradient of the cost increase was an important factor
to determine the structure of social relationships. In communication systems
with the large gradient of social grooming costs, people tend to construct wide
and shallow social relationships. In contrast, people tend to maintain close
social relationships with limited partners in the communication system with a
small gradient of social grooming costs.
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The variation of the gradient may explain why human beings use different
social grooming methods according to their different social relationships. Hu-
man beings’ lightweight social grooming has evolved to adapt large groups, for
example, gaze grooming (Kobayashi H and Kohshima S, 1997; Kobayashi
H and Hashiya K, 2011) and gossip (Dunbar RIM, 2004), because these
grooming methods enable humans to have several social relationships and re-
quire less time and efforts. For example, in text communications over the In-
ternet, such as on Twitter, users tend to construct wide and shallow social
relationships that are used for acquiring and diffusing information (Arnaboldi
V et al., 2013c; Preoiuc-Pietro D, 2015). Thus, lightweight social groom-
ing is effective in constructing many weak social relationships. In contrast,
elaborate social grooming methods are more effective than lightweight social
grooming methods in reinforcing social relationships (Burke M and Kraut
RE, 2014). Additionally, for strong social relationships, human beings prefer
elaborate social grooming methods, such as face-to-face or telephone commu-
nications, rather than text communications over the Internet (Burke M and
Kraut RE, 2014). It may be because the degree of satisfaction from elabo-
rate social grooming methods (face to face and video calls) tend to be higher
than that from lightweight social grooming methods (phone and text commu-
nication) (Vlahovic T et al., 2013). Therefore, we infer that the gradient of
elaborate social grooming costs is smaller than that of lightweight social groom-
ing costs, and the intercept of lightweight social grooming methods is smaller
than that of elaborate social grooming methods. Thereby, human beings tend
to construct new social relationships and maintain weak social relationships by
using lightweight social grooming methods, and they tend to use elaborate social
grooming methods to maintain strong social relationships. It thus suggests that
an emergence of novel social grooming methods can change social structures,
for example, the evolution of gaze grooming (Kobayashi H and Kohshima
S, 1997; Kobayashi H and Hashiya K, 2011) and gossip (Dunbar RIM,
2004). That is, the evolution of human beings’ lightweight social grooming to
adapt large groups suggests that they have made wide and shallow societies. It
may shed light on the emergence of our huge modern societies. Additionally,
our findings also suggest predictability of the invention effects of novel commu-
nications over the Internet on social structures, that is, in the novel lightweight
social grooming will drive wide and shallow social structures, and novel elabo-
rate social grooming will drive narrow and deep social structures.
The strengthening of already strong social relationships (the Yule-Simon
process which generates power law distributions) and the positive gradient of
social grooming costs, which represent a time cost distribution strategy, seem
to have been caused by competing for cooperating with others. That is, strong
social relationships may exist for receiving cooperation from others (Brown SL
and Brown RM, 2006; Miritello G et al., 2013b). However, cooperators
cannot cooperate with everyone because there are costs of cooperation (Santos
FC, 2006; Xu B and Wang J, 2015). Actually, human beings tend to
cooperate with close friends (Haan M et al., 2006; Harrison F et al.,
2011; Dunbar RIM, 2016). Consequently, human beings would need to
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compete based on the strength of the social relationships with the cooperators’
friends and this may generate a skewed distribution for the strength of social
relationships. Exploring evolutionary stability of this strategy for cooperation
will provide knowledge about evolutionary dynamics of human significant social
intelligence based on social brain hypothesis.
Additionally, our findings provide novel insight on social network sciences,
that is, a constraint on the construction of social relationships (C = Nma) and
its effect on social network structures, for example, they create constraints for
the dynamics of network generation and temporal networks.
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Table 1: Summaries of data sets. N and m were tallied for each individual, d
was tallied for each relationship and v was tallied for each combination between
relationship and day.
Communication System Variable Size min 2.5%ile 25%ile 50%ile 75%ile 97.5%ile max
Twitter N 2,585 7 28 65 94 136 264 736
m 2,585 1.25 1.84 2.79 3.55 4.66 8.61 25.23
d 278,475 1 1 1 1 3 20 166
v 943,719 2 21 54 94 136 383 14,120
755 Group chat N 17,796 1 1 5 9 17 51 187
m 17,796 1.00 1.43 2.44 3.53 5.60 18.00 112.00
d 238,611 1 1 1 2 4 18 112
v 901,212 1 1 17 48 143 1,072 31,990
755 Wall communication N 20,000 1 1 6 11 24 159 1,372
m 20,000 1.00 1.02 1.53 2.45 4.39 15.67 103.00
d 534,475 1 1 1 1 2 13 121
v 1,270,546 3 6 17 33 73 452 17,565
Ameba Pigg N 156,222 1 1 3 5 13 64 689
m 156,222 1.00 1.00 1.33 2.00 3.92 19.32 454.00
d 1,911,139 1 1 1 1 2 22 457
v 6,989,307 13 143 358 652 1,289 4,588 87,281
Mobile phone N 73 2 16 47 94 126 279 688
m 73 1.81 2.06 3.34 3.95 4.75 7.45 8.07
d 7,801 1 1 1 1 2 32 207
v 32,728 0 0 24 60 223 10,261 328,031
SMS N 48 1 1 4 11 19 194 283
m 48 1.00 1.00 1.68 2.85 4.03 11.35 30.5
d 1,233 1 1 1 1 2 30 153
v 4,942 1 1 1 3 7 36 168
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Figure 1: Power law distributions of number of days dij , where individual i
interacted with individual j. These results were similar to those of previous
studies (Hossmann T et al., 2011; Song C et al., 2012; Arnaboldi V
et al., 2012; Hu T et al., 2013; Fujihara A et al, 2014). Power law
coefficients were 1.92 (A: Twitter), 3.71 (B: 755 group chat), 2.29 (C: 755 wall
communication), 1.97 (D: Ameba Pigg), 1.98 (E: mobile phone) and 2.00 (F:
SMS).
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Figure 2: The Yule–Simon process on social grooming strategies. These figures
show probability p of social grooming on days after each strength of social
relationship d. This indicates that the power law distributions were generated by
the Yule-Simon process because the p was proportional to d, and these strategies
subsequently generated the power law distributions. The data periods were from
the first thirty days. We did not observe the similar trends in the mobile phone
and SMS data sets due to insufficient data. These results were similar in a
previous study (Pachur T et al., 2012).
Table 2: The results of the regression analysis (Eq. 1) of each communication
system. The t-values and the p-values of a measuring the statistical uncertainty
in coefficient a are larger than 1. The t-values and the p-values of b measuring
the statistical uncertainty in coefficient b are not equal to 0. The coefficient a
was larger than 1, that is, the user behaviour data did not obey the null model
(C = Nm; a = 1). Their adjusted R-squared values were 0.990 (Twitter), 0.974
(755 group chat), 0.959 (755 wall communication), 0.997 (Ameba Pigg), 0.994
(mobile phone) and 0.990 (SMS).
Communication System Coefficient Estimate Standard Error t-value p-value
Twitter a 1.189567 0.023256 8.15 4.4× 10−16
b 1.309346 0.006815 192.12 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 Group chat a 1.214229 0.004640 46.17 Less than 2.0× 10−16
b 1.269766 0.002294 553.5 Less than 2.0× 10−16
755 Wall communication a 1.562142 0.006250 89.94 Less than 2.0× 10−16
b 1.476393 0.002769 533.2 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Ameba Pigg a 1.0954104 0.0007440 128.24 Less than 2.0× 10−16
b 1.0939529 0.0003137 3487 Less than 2.0× 10−16
Mobile phone a 1.07332 0.15756 0.47 3.2× 10−1
b 1.25628 0.04689 26.795 Less than 2.0× 10−16
SMS a 1.24089 0.07815 3.08 3.5× 10−3
b 1.21949 0.02995 40.72 Less than 2.0× 10−16
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Figure 3: A simple law between N (total number of social grooming partners)
and m (mean number of social grooming days). These user behaviour data
(black points) did not obey the null model (C = Nm; orange lines), where
the assumed social grooming cost was independent of the strength of the re-
lationship, but obeyed C = Nma (green and dash lines), where a = 1.19 (A:
Twitter), a = 1.21 (B: 755 group chat), a = 1.56 (C: 755 wall communication),
a = 1.10 (D: Ameba Pigg), a = 1.07 (E: mobile phone) and a = 1.24 (F: SMS),
where user use-days u were 75th percentile, estimated by the regression mod-
els (Eq. 1), where adjusted R-squares were 0.990 (A: Twitter), 0.974 (B: 755
group chat), 0.959 (C: 755 wall communication), 0.997 (D: Ameba Pigg), 0.994
(E: mobile phone), 0.990 (F: SMS) (see table 2 for details), and a > 1 were
significant excluding the mobile phone data set.
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Figure 4: Increasing communication volumes per day v by strengths of social
relationships d, where the volumes were number of characters per day in Twit-
ter, 755 and Ameba Pigg, duration per day in mobile phones and frequency
of messaging per day in SMS because we did not consider any information re-
garding number of characters in the SMS data set. The orange lines are the
25th percentile, the green and dotted lines are the 50th percentile and the blue
and dashed lines are the 75th percentile. These are shown for cases where the
number of samples was more than 20 (the ranges of the d of mobile phone and
SMS are short because these were smaller data sets).
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Figure 5: The gradients of communication volumes depending on social groom-
ing density as distinct from those depending on social grooming frequency.
These figures show compaction of the medians of v for each social grooming
density (d/t) for different periods (t is number of days of the data periods).
Each line represents entire periods (orange lines), nine-tenths of the periods
(green and dotted lines), and eight-tenths of the periods (blue and dashed lines).
These are shown when the number of samples is more than 20 (the ranges of
d of mobile phone and SMS are short because the sizes of these data sets were
small).
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Figure 6: Explanation capacity of the simulation model. The results of fits by
the simulation model to the regression lines of all data sets (that is, green and
dashed lines in Fig. 3). Very good fits were observed between the simulation
results (orange triangles) and the regression lines (green lines); that is, the
simulation model displayed explanation capacity for the phenomenon a > 1
for C = Nma, with a monotonically increasing cost function (α > 0). The
parameters of the cost functions were α = 1.34 and β = 0.24 (A: Twitter),
α = 1.27 and β = 0.39 (B: 755 group chat), α = 3.89 and β = 0.23 (C: 755
wall communication), α = 1.62 and β = 0.64 (D: Ameba Pigg), α = 0.05 and
β = 0.31 (E: mobile phone) and α = 5.05 and β = 0.34 (F: SMS).
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Figure 7: Effect of the gradient of grooming cost function α on C = Nma and
the distribution of the strengths of social relationships in the simulation. Figure
A shows that gradient α increased a. Figures B and C show that the gradient α
increased the power law coefficients of the strengths of social relationships, that
is, the gradient increased width and shallowness of social relationships. The
parameters T , R and β were based on Twitter (see Fig. 6A) because β has
no effect on a. In figures A and B, the number of individuals was 200 and qi
included the 200 values used in [0, 1]. In figure C, the number of individuals
was 10, 000 and qi included the 10, 000 values used in [0, 1].
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